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Cousin Laman in the Wilderness:
The Beginnings of Brigham Young's
lndian Policy
By Richard Edmond Bennett
Historians ofthe American Westhave observed that compared with
most other mid -19th century American overlanders, whether Oregonbound farmers or California Argonauts, the Mormons enjoyed a
relatively more amicable, more peaceful relationship with the
American Indian. Furthermore several contend with cause that
Brigham Young was the principal architect of peace with the Ute,
Shoshoni, Navaho, Hopi, and other tribes in the deserts and valleys of
"Deseret," the Mormon Zion in the Great Basin Kingdom.
Leonard Arrington, Davis Bitton, James Allen, and other modern
writers have argued that Young pursued a conciliatory (if not self protective and condescending) policy toward the mountain tribes ofUtah
Territory; that he opposed the customary frontier theory that 'the only
good Indian was a dead one'; and that he abhorred the resulting practice of indiscriminately killing native people. 1
Young summarized his attitude in an 1854 speech:
1 have uniformly pursued a friendly course of policy towards them, feeling
convinced that independent of the question of exercising humanity
towards so degraded and ignorant a race ofpeople, it was manifestly more
economical and less expensive to feed and clothe than to fight them. 2

The purpose of this paper is: (1) to show that Young's policies,
benign or otherwise, did not originate in the Great Basin and that the
tactics he employed to ensure peace with mountain tribes were first
applied years before among the Plains Indians on the banks of the Missouri; and (2) that Young ran far ahead of his own people in terms of
popularity with the numerous native tribes.
Little will here be said about the sometimes difficult and often
scarred relations between Brigham Young and the various Indian
agents, superintendents, and commissioners of the Office of Indian
Affairs. Nor will this article explore Mormon and Indian collusion
against Missouri and other frontier societies. Both are related but very
complex topics and fall outside the immediate perimeters of this
study.
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Joseph Smith Jr. (1805-1844), the so-called "Mormon Prophet"
and founder of the Church of J esus Christ ofLatter-day Saints in 183 O,
had guided his people from upstate New York to Kirtland, Ohio; later
to Jackson County, Missouri; and eventually to Nauvoo, Illinois, in
unsuccessful attempts to find a place of refuge for his rapidly growing
number of followers. For a time it appeared that Nauvoo, Illinois, on
the Mississippi River just north of Quincy would prove if not a lasting
headquarters, then at least a comfortable resting place.
However, criticism and persecution of the "Saint" soon developed
once more, this time from nearby county residents, for reasons stemming from economic and political might to the peculiarities of the
Latter-day Saintreligion, includingthe practice ofpolygamy. This tide
of local disfavor, fueled by the agitation of Mormon defectors,
culminated in the murder of Joseph Smith and his brother Hyrum at
Carthage, Illinois, in June of 1844. In time Brigham Young, a native of
Vermont and head ofthe Quorum ofthe Twelve Apostles, the highest
governing body left in the church, carne to be regarded by most as
Joseph's interim or permanent successor. Young decided that the
Mormons had to quitN auvoo and seekrefuge in sorne isolated valley in
the Rocky Mountain West or face civil war. Hence beginning in February 1846, the first of several thousand Mormons began their tedious
trek across Iowa Territory. For a variety of reasons (including PresidentPolk's June 1846 enlistment of several hundred Mormons for service in Stephen W. Ke arny ,s Army of the W est to wrest California from
Mexico), Brigham Young decided to interrupt his westward march at
the Missouri River and to spend the winter of 1846-47 near Council
Bluffs. On the heels of that decision the Mormons established scores
of small temporary settlements in western Iowa between the
Nishnabotana and the Missouri Rivers near the Pottawattamie
Indians ofIowa. They gained permission to establish a city on the west
bank of the Missouri in lands occupied by the Oto and Omaha Indian
tribes, each suspicious of the other's claims. By January 1847 over
4,000 Mormons were living in Winter Quarters, a city regularly surveyed, laid out in large city blocks with wide streets, and fortified with
high picket fences. Another 8,000-9,000 settled across the river. The
city served as the primary springboard for the April 1847 trek west
that eventually resulted in the Mormon settlements on the shores of
the Great Salt Lake. But it was there at Winter Quarters (on land now
part of north Omaha, Nebraska, and in surrounding regions) that
Brigham Young was compelled to forge his policies toward the
American Indian.
Planting a large, white man's community, no matter how temporary,
in Indian territory among a destitute, well-armed, and suspicious
native population was hazardous enough; to do so on disputed lands
between two jealous tribes and within easy striking range of the
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marauding Sioux was a calculated risk with potentia11y disastrous consequences. Even though treaties had been signed between principals
of the Latter-day Saints and the Omaha and Oto, the Mormon people
rightly suspected düficulties. Their precarious situation demanded
artful negotiations, patience, and unending restraint to preserve harmony and peace. In a short time they faced repeated Indian depredations and intertribal wars. In large measure they were the
architects of their own unenviable situation and eventually paid a high
price for their deliberate decision to stay on Indian 1ands. Nevertheless, Mormon relations with the Indians remained surprisingly
peaceful.
Young's objective was to live in peace among the Indians while the
Mormons regrouped and prepared themselves for the trek farther
west. He did not want and could not afford war. But policies are based
on philosophies and requirements. Both natives and Mormons shared
suspicion and open disdain for a government in Washington which
they felt was unsympathetic (if not antagonistic) to their interests.
Many Indians, particularly of the Eastern tribes, felt powerless to
resist their inevitable displacement to areas farther west. The Mormons meanwhile had suffered Missouri Governor Lilburn W. Boggs's
"extermination order" and at the peril of life and property had been
forced to leave that state. Nor did Illinois prove more accepting. Pleas
for redress to local and state authorities, to Congress, and to the president were unheeded. Thus Indian leaders from the Pottawattamie and
other tri bes sensed a bond between two peoples in distress, common
sufferers in exile, and paid regular visits to J oseph Smith and Mormon
leaders in Nauvoo during the early 1840s.
But ü the Indians saw in the Latter-day Saints a potential political
a11y, the Mormons viewed the Indian as their theological responsibility. A central doctrine of the Book of Mormon, regarded by them as
additional scripture and a companion volume to the Bible, indicated
that American Indians, anciently called "Lamanites," were descendants of the prophet Jacob of the Old Testament, a remnant of the
tribe of Joseph through Manasseh, and consequently part of the
ancient House ofIsrael, God's "chosen people." The Book ofMormon
further stated that though a fallen and cursed people because of
transgression, "there are many promises which are extended to the
Lamanites" and "atsomeperiodoftimetheywill be broughtto believe
in his (Christ' s) word."3 According to the accepted revelations given to
Joseph Smith, "Jacob sha11 flourish in the wilderness, and the
Lamanites sha11 blossom as the rose.,,4 Although some ofthe early missions of the Church to the Indians were unsuccessful, it was widely held
in camp that the Lord's special promises were about to be fulfilled.
The expulsion of the Mormons from their lands in Missouri and most
recently in Nauvoo was interpreted, at least by some, that God was
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removing his Gospel from the Gentiles and was about to remember his
ancient covenant people, the Lamanites.
These beliefs were not only held by camp leaders but pervaded the
Mormon community generally. Wrote Fanny Murray, a sister of
Brigham Young:
We are here on the banks ofthe Missouri Rivel'. The Omahas are themost
degraded and worthless raee ofbeings that ever my eyes beheld .... Wc (jo
not suffer anything from fear of the Indians, for we know that fo)' thcir
sakes we are suffering al! tbese things, and we are sure that the Lord OUI'
God will not suffer them to destroy us. 5

Ifthe Latter-day Saints were not free of fear and prejudice towards the
Lamanites, their faith nevertheless demanded a genuine interest in
their temporal and spiritual welfare.
Butregardless ofreligious convictions, Young made it clear that this
was neither the time nor the place for spreading the word. While at
Winter Quarters they made few attempts to preach to their Indian
neighbors and refrained from manning missions and schoolhouses
among the tribes. The converting process would have to waitfor a more
propitious time.
To make war upon the Indians then was not only politically foolish
and inexpedient but religiously offensive. And with so many men away
in the Army, it was questionable whether the Mormons could have sustained any sort of extended armed conflicto Besides, the ludian might
prove a valuable ally in warding off attacking Missouri invaders 01'
Federal soldiers.
But aware of the potential dan gel' in living so close to local tribes,
Young took every precaution. This accounts in part for his determination to keep the settlements close together and for his scarcely concealed opposition to Bishop George Miller's independent,
unauthorized establishment among the Panca Indians on the Nio brara
River sorne 200 miles north of Winter Quarters. Safety lay in showing
large numbers and a strong, well-armed defense. The linchpin in his
peace policywas to show, but never use, a strong display offorce unless
in self-defense.
The first real test of Young's developing policies carne in January
1847 when a company of Sioux led by ChiefEagle made a surprisevisit
to chief cattle herder Asahel Lathrop's small encampment several
miles north of Winter Quarters. Attracted no doubt by the immense
number of cattle under Lathrop's jurisdiction, they represented a
band of over 300 warring Sioux then in the neighborhood and clearly
posed a serious threat to Lathrop's small contingento While in the
vicinity they killed 30 of Lathrop's herd and appeared ready to kill
more. Lathrop consequently invited Eagle and many of his braves to a
feast, gave them gifts, and endeavored to make peace. Eagle re-
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sponded that their purpose was to kill the Omaha and not the white
man, but that he sometimes had difficu1ty restraining his warriors.
Brigham Young, on hearing of this first serious encounter with the
dreaded Sioux, immediately sent twenty-three armed men to bolster
Lathrop's defenses and prevent any further outbreaks. His instructions to Lathrop were clear and underlined his policy of dealing from
strength not weakness:
Let the loss be what itmay, but you must be diligent and sleep with one eye
open and never again let the Indians 01' any other enemy within your fort.
To do this is to tbrow yourself in the power of your enemy, as it gives him an
advantage you cannot reeall, until it is too late ... keep them at respectful
distance with the power always in your hands.
Now, Brother Lathrop, you must watch as well as pray, and let the Indians
get no advantage of you, 01' learn your numerical strength again, but do the
best you can to give them su eh an opinion of your resourees as te put them
in awe ... and at the same time inspire them with eonfidence in your good
intentions (and) promote peace. 6

The Sioux never again returned and never constituted a serious threat
to the Mormons even though the opportunities to do so were many.
At Winter Quarters meanwhile it became standard policy to station
armed guards near the cattle herds around the city, and in other conspicuous place s to discourage lndian prowlers. Occasional cannon firing, military drills, and other conspicuous shows of force were all
designed for their defense.
A second and related policy was not to take sides or form alliances
with one tribe against another. The Omaha and Oto competed for protection and favor, and for the Mormons to favor one aboye the other
was extremely dangerous. Call for peace among them but let the
Indians fight their own battles. In early negotiations with the Omaha,
Young agreed to assist in their agricultural endeavors "but would not
interfere in any of their difficulties with other tribes." Such a course of
action would surely have enbroiled the Mormons in a savage cross-fire
and would have drawn objections from lndian agents, already concerned that such an impasse might develop.
A third principIe was to leave the Indian alone - to shun any social,
religious, or economic intercourse, especially with individuals. In
reality this was virtually impossible, given the Omaha's natural
curiosity and constant visits to the camp and the documented sympathy Mormons had for the begging and forlorn among the tribe,
especially for the women and children. This policy coincided with
federal regulations, and Young preferred not to break such laws and
risk investigation.
When in August several Oto brought roasting ears into camp to sell,
Young, supposing they had been stolen from Omaba corn fields,
warned his people not to buy them. Trading must be left strictly to
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camp leaders and carried out only on a collective basis. Liquor, available in camp, was an especiaHy forbidden trade item, and those found
guilty of seHing or distributing it among the Indians were punishable
by the whiplash. Feeding the Indians out of sympathy or for any other
cause was also prohibited. Mormons were constantly reminded to prevent their cattle from ranging on Indian corn fields and not to disturb
Indian graves and unexpected burial places. Children who played
.around the hills and surrounding graves were to be particularly careful
and "should be taught to let them alone.!!7
Dnder no circumstances would mating between races be permitted.
Such a practice had already caused difficulties and would not be countenanced. 8 AH forms offriendly camaraderie must be guarded against. 9
Shooting, stealing, and every other form of vengeful activity were
likewise prohibited. "It was wrongto indulge in feelings ofhostility and
bloodshed toward the Indian, who might kill a cow, an ox or even a
horse," Young counseled. "To them the deer, the buffalo, the cherry
and plum tree or strawberry bed were free. It was their mode ofliving to
kill and eat." But if they persisted in ro b bing and stealing, "after being
warned not to do so, whip them." ID Mormons must refrain from shooting Indians even "if they did catch them skinning their oxen."ll At all costs
bloodshed must be avoided. If anyone killed an Omaha for stealing, he
was guilty of murder and would be delivered to the appropriate Indian
chief "to be dealt with as the Indians shall decide, as that was the only
way to save the lives of the women and children.!!l2
Yet despite their policies of a strong defense, strict neutrality, and
noninvolvement, many meaningful and helpful exchanges between
peoples occurred. In December 1846 an unsuspecting party of sleeping Omaha was attacked by either a band of Sioux or lowa within
gunshot range of Winter Quarters. The wounded Omaha, including
Chief ,Big Head (shot in the arm, hand, and head) and several others,
were brought into camp and their wounds immediately dressed. 13 For a
time many of the Omaha, fearing further attack, were allowed to pitch
their tents next to Brigham Young's home. 14 "They would weep and
howl, cry, writhe and twist and make every gesture that could be
imagined," recalled Hosea Stout, and "they made such a noise that
President Young had them stopt (SiC).!!l5
Accounting for their outburst was the even worse news that just
sixty miles north an Omahá hunting party had been attacked at night
by the Sioux (likely Chief Eagle's warriors), and seventy-three oftheir
number had beeil killed. 16 When the survivors passed through town,
they took with them Big Head's party and encamped near Winter
Quarters. Having pity on the Omaha in their tenuous circumstance, the
Winter Quarters High Council decided "to build them a house at a spot
naturally well fortified and from which they could discern the approach
of any enemy at some distance.'m Eventually many Omaha crossed
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the river to seek safety among the Pottawattamie. The Mormons sympathized more with the Omaha than with any other tribe. Said
Appleton Milo Harmon, "The sufferings of these poor miserable
beings was immence [sic] and excited the sumpathy [sic] of our people
who gave them several beef cattle and a great amount of bread.>H8
As a result of deliberate attempts to deal justly and peaceably with
the Indians, Indian agents were initially complimentary. "With regard
to their intercourse with the Indian tribes in particular," wrote R. B.
Mitche11, "1 would remark that it has been greatly more circumspect
and unexceptionable than is usually found to be the case with emigrant
bodies passing through this region of country.'>19 Later Mitche11
remarked, "So far as 1 know, the general conduct of the Mormon peopIe has continued irreproachable."20
But as time passed, relations deteriorated. Unsuccessful buffalo
hunts and corn and other crop failures compelled the Omaha either to
steal or to starve. Said Horace K. Whitney, "They have had for some
time in contemplation a grand buffalo hunt, which they have abandoned in expectation of living and sustaining themselves by the killing
of our cattle instead.»21 The increased fear of Indian encroachment
persuaded the High Council to fence the city's southern perimeter and
to picket most of the town. Despite their labors, by mid -October the
Indians were a11egedly killing "two or three oxen per day."22
While concerned with the economic losses, Young worried more
about restraining his people from overreacting. Believing dialogue
better than confrontation, he called for a series of meetings. "W e want
such an understanding with the Omaha," he wrote, "as to prevent any
collision or trouble for our feelings are kind toward them and a11
men.»23
Chief Elk in response admitted, "1 cannot guide a11 of my people;
they are wild; they are just like the wolves of the prairie for when they
are hungry they don't know better than to take what is handist [sic]. "24
Big Elk confessed that his tribe called him "a liar" when he told them
the Mormons would do them well. As a partíal solution, he and Logan
Fontenelle, a local translator and mountaineer, recommended they
build fences around every cattle herd, large or small, in or out of the
city, and that they whip any stealing Indian. 25 They further advised
that Mormons neither socialize with nor befriend loiterers and that
they stop selling dogs to the Omaha. The Indiañs would kill them "so
that they could more easily pilfer from uso "26
Though Big Elk often returned items his people had stolen from
Winter Quarters, 27 tensions increased, straining goodwill almost to the
breaking point. By late October at least fifty oxen and many sheep had
been ki11ed. 28 By April1847 Hosea Stout estimated that "the amount
of cattle killed by them the past winter and spring is incredible.,,29 "Incredible," according to Young, meant "from three to 5,000 dollars
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worth of cattle," probably enough to prevent the camp from moving en
masse to the mountains in spring. ao
What had happened? It would be easy and not necessarily incorrect
to say that the Omaha were running scared. Their numbers had be en
decimated. They felt themselves the victims of both Sioux and Oto
depredations and were taking out their frustrations on peaceful
neighbors. Without a supply of buffalo meat, beef would do.
But the Mormons, too, had been guilty of indiscretions despite
counsel by their leaders. After the above-described slaughter by the
Sioux of over seventy Omaha, Henry W. Miller and Arza Adams, while
leading a cattle-grazing company, had inadvertently stumbled onto
the massacre site some days after the gruesome tragedy. Most of the
dead bodies had been stripped of buffalo robes, moccasins, and
leggings by the Sioux, while tents and lodges had also been taken. But
Miller, after nursing the wounds of one dying squaw, inappropriately
took some tattered robes, two ponies, and between twenty and forty
beef hides, which he suspected had be en stolen from the Mormons.
Hearing of it, an anxious Young bolted off a letter saying, "If you have
committed any such overt act in any degree, give not sleep to your eyes
... till you have replaced every article which has been removed." He
urged Miller "to appease the wrath of an ignorant but insulted people
and therefore, if possible save your lives. "a1 Though the goods were a11
returned, an insult had been carelessly made.
And while the Mormons had been careful not to use much of the
already scarce surrounding timber, the small amounts they did consume gave provocation. The Omaha were j ealous of the many guns in
the Mormon camp and of the sizeable number of wild turkey and other
small animals lost to Mormon hunters. And the efforts ofthe Mormons
at keeping out the Omaha, especially duringthe winter, and preventing
them from enjoying their fires and shelters were resented.
In an April conference of a11 interested parties, Chief Big Elk gave
his side of the matter as reported by W. W. Phelps:
Said we were not wise in complaining so. "You cut hay but people must
buy it if one wants to warm can't do it but you can take our wood and it
won't grow u p tomorrow - ourfather will not buy our lands So good ... your
head men said you would shelter us, but you come among us and first we
know up rises a city eat up our grass kili our game scare it away come to live
where we used to hunt and find pea vines and plenty of cattle must not kilI
your cattle but our game all scared away - vines all trodden down - You
were here to protect us, but down comes the Sioux and murders [sic] us
that your fault .... You can't raise up our timber can't raise up our dead
men so you are the aggressors."a2

By the time Brigham Young and his advance pioneer company had
departed westward in Apri11847 on their long postponedjourney to
the Rockies, relations between Mormons and Indians were at their

Hosea Stout. Courtesy ofChurchArchives, The Church ofJesus Christ ofLatterday Saints.

OrsonHyde. Courtesy oi ChurchArchives, The Church oi Jesus Christ oi Latterday Saints.
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lowest point. With Young gone, leadership eventually fell to Orson
Hyde, the only apostle left at Winter Quarters after John Taylor and
Parley P. Pratt had led out a large company in June in Young's wake.
Hyde, only recently returned from Great Britain, relied heavily on the
impetuous Hosea Stout, leader of the town police.
It soon became manifest that some of Young's underlings were certainly less popular than he had been with the Indian. After an
acrimonious confrontation in late May with Stout and Cornelius Lott,
Big Elk wished that the "Big Red headed chief [Young]" were back "for
he would treat them better.,,33 Ten days later eighty Omaha came to
Winter Quarters to negotiate peace, but Stout met them on horseback
and in armed fashion "according to the Danite system of horsemanship."34 Young's dialogue was being replaced with Stout's
intransigence and belligerence and with Hyde's ambivalence.
Matters came to a dangerous climax in June when word was received
back at Winter Quarters that Omaha Indians had shot and killed Jaco b
Weatherby, unarmed, a few miles east of the Elkhorn River in the first
apparent case of bloodshed between Mormons and Indians at the Missouri. 35 The Omaha were also charged with killing four or five other
whites on assignments from various local Indian agencies. 36
Responding to Weatherby's death, Stout tried to round up an army
of 150 men to mete out justice upon the guilty Omaha. On 22 June
Stout rode out at the head of a slightly smaller posse offifty-three men
"with the intention of making war on the Omahas in case they did [not]
give up the murder[er]."37
Speaking of the same matter, Orson Hyde indicated they intended
to demand of agent J ohn Miller that he get the Omaha to turn over the
offender, "but if not we intend to go prepared to chastise the (Omaha)
nation according to their just deserts. 1 must now stop and prepare my
rifle and shooters for a campaign."38 Stout wanted at least Miller's
assistant, R. B. Mitchell, to lead the expedition against the Omaha.
But Mitchell told Hyde and Stout that since he was only the subagent and had responsibilities only for the Pottawattamie, not the
Omaha, he had no authority to act in behalf ofthe absent senior agent,
Major John Miller. Stout, thinking Mitchell a prejudiced, spineless
"inveterate enemy" and "a most infamous rascal," saw what he considered a conspiracy to justify federal interposition. Sáid Stout:
It would have therefore been very easy for him to played [sic] the game to
engage us in a war with the Omahas and leave us in the difficulty ... in case
he led liS into an engagement and did not mentain [sic] his position or
attempt to desert or betray us we would have put him to death. 39

John D. Lee, who went along for the ride to Bellevue, recalled that
Mitchell discouraged any armed foray against the Indians and told
them to stop their hunt for the murdered. "Jesus Christ," he said,
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"could not hinder them from killing the cattle." Like Stout, Lee concluded that MitcheH was deliberately uncooperative and was cleverly
trying to goad them into armed conflict "to justify them in calling the
militia on US.,,40 Frustrated by Mitchell's determination not to pursue
the criminals, Stout's posse returned home, and "the whole expedition
carne to naught.,,41
The Hyde-Stout-Mitchell incident is cited as evidence of a
smouldering prejudice and animosity that several secondary Mormon
leaders held toward the lndian in spite of political and theological considerations. The murder of one innocent teamster and a winter full of
stolen property was enough for them to start their own lndian war of
extermination. While Stout was more hot tempered than most of his
colleagues and was hated by many of his own people, this episode
proves that without Young's steadier, calmer hand, serious conflicts
could and did erupt.
During the second and final year of Winter Quarters, relations between the Omaha and Mormons greatly improved, largely because
Young's sense of diplomacy and justice replaced the impetuousness
and lack of common sense that afflicted some of his over-zealous
lieutenants.42 The Mormons planted and harvested large corn crops
for the Omaha, transported many of their shipments, and in other ways
worked diligently at fostering and maintaining peace. 43 In light of the
generally positive climate between the two peoples, Young's benign
policies toward them, and effective protection of a small tribe which
the Sioux in alllikelihood would have destroyed, it is difficult to agree
with one recent writer who argued that "if the Mormon encampment
was not positively harmful to the Indians, it did them little goOd."44
And though Young was not convinced that the initial agreements with
the Omaha extended to their possessing aH improvements on the Winter Quarters site after its abandonment, when Young and the High
Council finally agreed in November 1847 to leave it,he demanded that
the Omaha inherit as much of the city as possible. He also urged the
government to take immediate steps to protect them by moving the
Council Bluffs agency from BeHevue to Winter Quarters to serve as a
buffer between the Omaha and the Sioux.
In conclusion, Young's policies of neutrality, negotiating from
strength, benevolent detachment, patience, and restraint fostered a
generally healthy social climate. Cooperation, not confrontation, was
imperative. These policies formed the basis ofhis future contacts with
Indian tribes in the mountain West. And while it may be argued that he
had as much difficulty in controlling his own people's attitudes
towards the lndian as he did the Indian himself, Young was comparatively successful in piloting a peaceful course. 45
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